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"Je Recuse!": The Disqualification of
a Judge
Ralph Slovenko*
"0, what may man within him hide,
"Though angel on the outward side!"
- Shakespeare, Measure for Measure,
Act III, Scene ii, lines 251-2.
I. IN GENERAL
Socrates postulated that "Four things belong to a judge: To
hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, to decide
impartially."' The well-advertised slogan through the ages of
the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge"'2 has given rise to the
belief that a judge must not be anti-anything.3 When, in 1956,
Jean-Paul Sartre in a letter to the New York Times expressed
his view that Morton Sobell was innocent of the charge of con-
spiracy to commit espionage, the United States Attorney in the
case replied to Sartre's letter with the sententious rebuke: "Phi-
losophers should be careful not to substitute emotion and preju-
dice for true inquiry and objectivity." 4
A judicial decision is a decision by a human being called a
judge. More often than not, it is forgotten that a judge is a
human being, and that, as a human being, his action is shaped
by his heredity and by his environment. Among those influences
which affect judicial decisions are the judge's education and
associations, his political and economic and social philosophy,
*Assistant Professor of Law, Tulane University.
1. Quoted, among many places, in Lazarus, In Memory of Charles A. O'Neill,
219 La. xxxix (1951) ; Yankwich, The Art of Being a Judge, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
374, 385 (1957).
2. This expression of Burke's is employed in State v. Bordelon, 141 La. 611,
75 So. 429 (1917). See also Palmer v. Atkinson, 116 Fla. 366, 156 So. 726
(1934).
3. See, e.g., Lummus, Our Heritage of Impartial Justice, 19 B.U.L. REV. 2
(1939) ; Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLirn. L. REV. 696, 710 (1912).
It was "Blackstone's axiom that the judge is a mere passive oracle or mouth-
piece of a somewhat called Law, a sort of a speaking-tube through which Law
talks to the laity." Frank, Mr. Justice Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking,
17 CORNELL L.Q. 568, 582 (1932).
4. Letter of Mr. Paul W. Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York, to New York Times, June 26, 1956, p. 28, col. 6, in reply
to Sartre's letter of June 15, 1956.
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and his economic and social status.5 The act of becoming a judge
does not convert a person into an individual without emotion
and prejudice. Human motives and mental processes are not
transformed when one assumes the judicial function. As Judge
Frank put it, "Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by
putting on a black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge,
a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections,
becomes a passionless thinking machine."6 In a similar vein,
philosopher Morris Cohen wrote: "The dogma that judicial de-
cisions follow logically from the provisions of the Constitution
involves the unbelievable psychological assertion that when men
mount the judicial bench they become, unlike all other human
beings, altogether free from personal or class bias or the preju-
dices of their limited education and experience. History, how-
ever, indicates that their actual decisions do depend upon their
personal, social, and economic opinions."' 7 Professor Alban Win-
5. See CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCES'S (1921) ; DiENSTEIl,
ARE You GuiLTY? 93-97 (1954) ; Chafee, Economic Interpretation of Judges, 31
NEW REPUBLIC 36 (June 7, 1922) ; Davidson, Judge Goldaborough Takes the
Stand, 122 COLLIER'S 20 (Aug. 7, 1958) ; Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive:
The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929) ;
Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CALIF. L. REV. '89
(1918). See also Armstrong, What Do the Justices Read? Books of Interest to
Supreme Court Members, 35 A.B.A.J. 295 (1949).
6. Frank, J., in In re Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1943). See also
Frank, The Cult of the Robe, 28 SAT. R. LIT. 12 (Oct. 13, 1945) : "[N]o . . .
change occurs in a man with the donning of a robe. At least in my case it didn't.
When I woke up one morning a federal judge, I found myself just about the same
person who had gone to bed the night before an S.E.C. Commissioner. My intimate
acquaintance with judges confirms my impression that the robe works no major
transformation."
"Frank believes that . . . the process of making decisions is in reality a gestalt
or composite of the psychological, environmental, and socio-economic factors that
go into the development of the personality of the individual judge." Paul, Jerome
Frank's Contributions to the Philosophy of American Legal Realism, 11 VAND. L.
REV. 753, 754 (1958).
Compare what Justice Frankfurter said in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) : "The judicial process demands that a judge
move within the framework of relevant legal rules and the covenanted modes of
thought for ascertaining them. He must think dispassionately and submerge pri-
vate feeling on every aspect of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk that
the judicial robe does not change the man within it. It does. [The robe may af-
fect or change the emotion and prejudices of the man, but it does not transform
him into a man without emotion and prejudice.) The fact is that on the whole
judges do lay aside private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is
achieved through training, professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate
alchemy by which men are loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted.
But it is also true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence of feelings
of which it is unaware. When there is ground for believing that such unconscious
feelings may operate in the ultimate judgment, or may not unfairly lead others to
believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves. They do not sit in judgment.
They do this for a variety of reasons. The guiding consideration is that the ad-
ministration of justice should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well as be
so in fact."
7. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL 180 (1946). See also CARDozo, THE
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spear in his two books, Who Was Socrates? and The Genesis of
Plato's Thought, points out that what Plato found in his ethereal
realm of ideas concerning the nature of justice and right was
what an Athenian gentleman of the old land-owning class, in his
struggle against the alliance of commercial and artisan elements,
might have put there.8 The philosophical and social outlook of
the judge, held consciously or unconsciously, is one of the three
elements which Roscoe Pound considers to make up the law.9
The celebrated Cartesian method of doubt recommends that
every man of serious intellectual aims should, at least once in
life, make the experiment of doubting everything that he has
believed hitherto. It is impossible, however, to begin with com-
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 12 (1921) : "There is in each of us a stream
of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence
and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current any more
than other mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot
name, have been tugging at them -inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired
convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social needs,
a sense of James' phrase of 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos,' which,
when reasons are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall. In
this mental background every problem finds its setting. We may try to see things
as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own. To that test they are all brought -a form of pleading or an act
of parliament, the wrongs of paupers or the rights of princes, a village ordinance
or a nation's charter." SINCLAIR, TnE CONDITIONS OF KNOWING 134 (1951):
"None of us can see the lenses of our spectacles though we see everything else
through them. Yet the lenses of our spectacles through which we see are most
important as everything is judged through them."
8. "The robe . . . gives the impression of uniformity in the decisions of the
priestly tribe. Says the uniform black garment to the public mind: Judges attain
their wisdom from a single, superhuman source; their individual attitudes never
have any effect on what they decide. Patently that belief is delusional. Else no
judge would ever write a dissenting opinion -a practice not of recent vintage,
as many persons believe, but in the Supreme Court dating back to 1793, three
years after that Court's creation." Frank, The Cult of the Robe, 28 SAT. R. LIT.
12, I3 (Oct. 13, 1945). When man's conceptions are outdated, when old values
are confused with new, forgetting that times change, the result is illustrated by
the tale of Don Quixote, who, full of the romances of noble knights rescuing fair
ladies from villainous marauders, dons his armor for a crusade of righteousness.
Professor Mitchell Franklin in an article in the Tulane Law Review emphasizes
"interests" as the subject matter of law: "A source of confusion in current juris-
prudence has been the failure of jurists to take account of the interests that are
secured by the legal order, and of the manner of adjusting these interests, as they
arise from the press and struggle of life and impress themselves in various ways
upon the law-maker, legislative and judicial. The effect of the failure to recognize
that interests are the subject-matter of law has given, on one hand, a theory that
law-making or law-judging is entirely capricious, so that the results reached by
the legal machine are either the effect of the environment upon the law-maker or
judge, which is a behavioristic interpretation, or of the effect of unconscious
intellectual elements upon the law-maker or judge, which is a psycho-analytical
psychological interpretation. In either event, theories of irresponsibility in law-
making and judging obtain." Franklin, Security of Acqui8ition and of Transac-
tion: La Possession Vaut Titre and Bona Fide Purchase, 6 TUL. L. REV. 589
(1932).
9. According to Roscoe Pound, three elements make up the whole of what we
call law: (1) "a number of legal precepts more or less defined"; (2) "a body of
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plete doubt.' 0 An individual must begin with all the prejudices
which he actually has when he enters into a certain purpose, and
these prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are
things which it does not occur to him can be questioned. A per-
son may, it is true, in the course of his learning, find reason to
doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts be-
cause he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the
Cartesian maxim.
It must be conceded then that the law is not administered
by a non-personal being without emotion and prejudice." The
judge's mind is not, as it were, tabula rasa. If general attitudes
were grounds for disqualification, it would be impossible to fill
the bench. Professor Jaffe expresses it this way: "It may well
be that a sincere conviction as to public policy predisposes the
mind where it might otherwise be in a position of doubt or bal-
ance on a conflict of fact or a choice of applicable principle. But
to announce out of hand that such a state of mind constitutes a
'disqualification' is in part Quixotic and in part non-sequitur.
... If emotionally determined values constituted a disqualifica-
tion, judges would be under constant attack and judicial-consti-
tutional law non-existent. Nor is this entirely a matter of neces-
sary evil. Certain persons give thanks for the predispositions of
Mr. Justice Butler and certain others looked upon Mr. Justice
traditional ideas" as to the method of application of these legal precepts and "a
traditional technique of developing and applying" these legal precepts; and (3)
"a body of philosophical, political, and ethical ideas as to the end of law," held
consciously or unconsciously, "with reference to which legal precepts and the
traditional ideas of application and decision and the traditional technique" are
shaped and applied. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv.
641, 645 (1923).
See also GAUDET, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY 450 (1949): "[M]ost lay-
men and many legal writers state, as was the case in some of our early state
constitutions, that we have a justice of laws, not of men. More sophisticated
scholars, however, agree with the assertion of Chief Justice Hughes that this is
a fallacy and that instead of the dichotomy of laws versus men we should state it
thus: we have a justice of laws through men."
10. As the until recently ignored American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce
(1839-1914) has pointed out. 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE 265
(1931-35). It was only in the 1930's after the collection of his scattered papers
into six volumes, that Peirce's pre-eminence as a philosopher could be recognized.
Some people now claim that Peirce ranks as the most original philosopher of the
nineteenth century. Commentaries of Peirce's philosophy include Bucn'r.a,
CHARLES PEIRCE'S EMPIRICISM (1939); FEIBLEMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PEIRCE'S PHILOSOPHY, INTERPRETED AS A SYSTEM (1946); GALLIE, PEIRCE AND
PRAGMATISM (1952); GOUDGE, THE THOUGHT OF C. S. PEIRCE (1950) ; WINER,
EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM, ch. IV (1949); STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE (a collection of essays by various
authors in honor of Peirce, sponsored by the Peirce Society of America, 1951).
11. Dr. Lucien Mehl, a French lawyer, mathematician and one-time judge,
recently put before an international "electronic brains" conference in England a
proposal for an electronic judging machine. He suggested that someone could con-
1959]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Holmes' prejudices in favor of free speech as the most precious
of safeguards.'
12
What, then, is the "impartiality" required of a judge? Judges
are characterized as "tough" or "lenient," "conservative" or
"liberal." These attitudes or characteristics do not constitute a
disqualification for cause. To determine the meaning of "impar-
tiality" which serves to disqualify a judge for cause, it is neces-
sary to distinguish a generalized attitude or ideological charac-
teristic on the one hand from a personal (individual-to-individ-
ual) bias on the other. A personal bias may be the result of a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the trial, an individual an-
tagonism, a relationship to one of the'parties, or a corrupt con-
spiracy. The distinction between a general attitude or ideology
and a personal bias is important for two reasons. First of all,
unlike the case of personal bias, a judge without an ideology,
explicit or implicit, is non-existent. Every person, whether he
admits it or not, has a philosophy of life. Secondly, the reason
that personal bias is a ground for disqualification, whereas gen-
eral attitude is not or cannot be, is that personal bias cannot be
overcome by evidence at the trial, no matter how persuasive, be-
cause the bias is purely capricious and fortuitous and has no rela-
tion to the merits of the issues.'3 There is the possibility, on the
other hand, of overcoming or changing a previous attitude or
ideology by evidence. 14
struct an electronic brain able to "learn" all the laws and legal precedents, sort
out the ones applying to a particular case, and arrange them in logical order to
arrive at a conclusion. New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 22, 1958, p. 16, col. 2.
See WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LoGIco-PHILosoPHIcuS (1955), which is the
fountain-head of logical positivism with regard to its most important tenets, for
a presentation of a philosophy that the world consists in a discrete number of
brute facts. The conception of the mechanical function of the judge, and also that
"facts" are out there to be picked like grapes off a vine, is implicit in the con-
temporary criticism of the segregation and communism decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Schweppe, Court Rewrites Constitution in its
own Image, 88 AMERICAN MERCURY 60 (Feb. 1959).
12. Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV.
1201, 1218-19 (1939). For one man's "dream-court," see Rodell, A Gallery of
Justices, SAT. REV. 9 (Nov. 15, 1958).
13. The distinction between general attitude and personal bias is the age-old
one between the general and the particular. Thus, a judge who is anti- or pro-
Negro or anti- or pro-Communist is not subject to recusation for cause when a
party in the case is a Negro or a Communist. The 'bias is not restricted to a par-
ticular party, but is general in nature. It applies to a class, and the fact that this
party is a member of the class against whom the judge is prejudiced is not ground
for recusation for cause. If, on the other hand, it should happen that the party
at one time swindled the judge, he could demand the recusation of the judge for
reason of personal bias.
14. See Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARv.
L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1939). This analysis is also relevant to the disqualification
[Vol. XIX
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II. LEGAL CAUSES FOR RECUSATION
The remedy of recusation is found in the Codex of Justinian:
"Although a judge has been appointed by imperial power yet be-
cause it is our pleasure that all litigations should proceed with-
out suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks the judge
under suspicion to recuse him before issue joined, so that the
of officers of administrative agencies, prosecuting attorneys, and prospective
jurors.
On disqualification of administrative officers, see Federal Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, § 7(a), 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952) ; Godman, Dis-
qualification for Bias of Judicial and Administrative Officers, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.
109 (1948) ; Scott, Bias of Trial Examiner and Due Process of Law, 30 GEo. L.J.
54 (1941) ; Sedgewick, Disqualification on the Ground of Bias as Applied to Ad-
ministrative Tribunals, 23 CAN. B. REv. 453 (1945) ; Note, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
1384 (1941).
On disqualification of district attorney, see LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. arts. 310,
311 (1928). Article 310 provides: "Any district attorney shall be recused by thejudge in criminal cases: (1) If said district attorney be related to the party
accused or to the party injured within the fourth degree, or be his father-in-law,
or his son-in-law, or his brother-in-law, or be the husband of the accused or of the
party injured; (2) If said district attorney shall have been employed or consulted
as attorney for the accused before his election or appointment as district attorney;
(3) If said district attorney shall have a personal interest adverse to that of the
prosecution."
In the case of State v. Tate, 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108 (1936), the defendant
filed a motion to recuse the district attorney in an arson trial on the ground that
the district attorney at the same time represented, on a contingent basis, an in-
surance company suing the defendant for damage to the property, and that there-
fore it was to be to the district attorney's advantage to secure a conviction of the
defendant. The Supreme Court stated that a district attorney should not be in-
volved or interested in any extrinsic matters which might, consciously or uncon-
sciously, impair or destroy his power to conduct the accused's trial fairly and im-
partially. Ruling that the district attorney shall be recused under Article 310(3),
the court said that the provision is broad enough to cover the case where the dis-
trict attorney is of counsel in a civil action against the accused based substan-
tially on the same or on closely related facts. See also State v. Marcotte, 229 La.
539, 86 So.2d 186 (1956).
Compare the French procedure for recusation of prosecuting attorney: "The
causes of recusation set out in Article 381 of the Code of Civil Procedure are ap-
plicable to judges and can be invoked against the prosecuting attorney when he
is a joint party in a civil matter. But, in penal matters, the prosecuting attorney
is always a principal party. A litigant cannot recuse his adversary." DE VABRES,
PatCIS DE DROIT CRIMINEL § 783 (1953).
On disqualification of a prospective juror, see LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. arts.
351, 352 (1928). Three causes are provided in Article 351 for challenging a pro-
spective juror: "(1) That he is not impartial, the cause of his bias being imma-
terial; but an opinion as to guilt or innocence of the accused, which is not fixed,
or has not been deliberately formed, or that would yield to evidence, or that could
be changed, does not disqualify the juror; (2) That the relations, whether by
blood, marriage, employment, friendship or enmity, between the juror and the
accused, or between the juror and the person injured, are such that it must be
reasonably believed that they would influence the juror in coming to a verdict;
(3) That the juror served on the grand jury which found the indictment, or on a
petit jury which once tried the defendant for the same offense, or on the coroner'sjury that investigated the homicide charged against the accused." Article 352
provides causes for challenge based on certain general attitudes or philosophy
which are exercisable only on the part of the prosecution. They are: "(1) That
the juror is biased against the enforcement of the statute charged to have been
violated, or is of the fixed opinion that the statute is unconstitutional; or (2)
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cause go to another." 15 In England, on the other hand, judges,
being differently appointed and not being triers of the facts,
have not been subject to recusation.'8 There was one exception:
a judge could not sit in his own cause and therefore he was dis-
qualified for direct pecuniary interest. 17 It was Louisiana, with
its civil law procedure, which introduced the remedy of recusa-
tion to the common law world of the United States.' 8 The rule
for the disqualification of a judge at common law, originally only
for pecuniary interest, was widely changed in the various states
by statute during the nineteenth century.
Personal bias or prejudice, in the ordinary sense of the term,
may result from innumerable conditions in life. The number of
factors which might cause a judge to be prejudiced is inconceiv-
able. The Louisiana legislature, however, in Article 338 of the
Code of Practice of 1825, the first statutory provision on the
subject in the state, did not concisely and comprehensively pro-
vide that "personal bias or prejudice" is cause for recusation of
a judge. Instead, it listed four sub-implicant propositions as
grounds for disqualification. They are: (1) His being inter-
ested in the cause; (2) His being in any way related to one of
the parties; (3) His having been employed, or consulted as ad-
vocate in the cause; and (4) His being a material witness in the
cause for either party.' 9 In 1858 a statute was passed which pro-
That the juror tendered in a capital case has conscientious scruples against the
infliction of capital punishment; or (3) That the juror would not convict upon
circumstantial evidence." See Slovenko, The Jury System in Louisiana Criminal
Law, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 655, 696 (1957). See also FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND 170-85, 302-09 (1930) ; Redmount, Psychological Tests for
Selecting Jurors, 5 KAN. L. REV. 391 (1957).
15. JUSTINIAN CODE 3.1.16.
16. Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORN. L.Q. 1, 4 (1923).
17. Ibid. See also Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609
(1947).
18. See Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORN. L.Q. 1, 7 (1923).
19. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 338 (1825). Subsequent legislation has been
more detailed. Act 35 of 1882 provided: "Section 1. . . .That Article 338 of the
Code of Practice [of 1870], be so amended and re-enacted as to read as follows:
The causes for which a Judge shall be recused are: 1. His being interested in the
cause; provided, that in all civil and criminal causes in which the State, the par-
ishes, or political or religious corporations are interested, it shall not be sufficient
cause to challenge the Judge or Justice of the Peace who may have cognizance of
the case (nor the Sheriff or the executive officer, or any of the jurors who are
called to serve in the cause), to allege that they are citizens or inhabitants of the
State, or of the parishes, or members of the said political or religious corporations,
or that they pay any State, parish or city tax. 2. His being related to one of the
parties within the fourth degree. 3. His having been employed, or consulted as
advocate in the cause. 4. His being father-in-law, son-in-law, or brother-in-law of
one of the parties. 5. His having performed any judicial act in the cause, in any
other court."
Act 203 of 1918 added a sixth cause to Article 338 of the Code of Practice:
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vided for the recusation of judges in criminal cases.20 Prior to
1858, the only statutory law on recusation in Louisiana was the
aforementioned article of the Code of Practice, which by its
terms was confined in its application to civil cases.
It was not until 1950 that the Louisiana legislature provided
identical causes for recusation in civil and criminal cases. There
is no reason for a distinction in the law of recusation between
civil and criminal procedure. The principles of law which de-
termine whether a person has a fair and impartial judge are the
same whether the case be civil or criminal. 21 Article 337 of the
Code of Practice, as amended by Act 336 of 1948, and Article
"6. His being the father, brother, or son of any one of the attorneys employed in
the cause."
By Act 336 of 1948, the provisions on recusation in the Code of Practice were
completely rewritten on the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
See discussion page 652 infra.
20. By the Crimes Act of 1805, Louisiana adopted the crimes and procedures
of the common law. Act 303 of 1858, the first statute on recusation in criminal
cases, provided: "That any judge may be recused or may recuse himself in crim-
inal cases if said judge be connected by blood or marriage with any person charged
with any offense against the laws of the State." This provision appears as LA.
R.S. § 1067 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1877, No. 35, which reads in part:
"Section 1. That section . . . [1067] . . . of the Revised Statutes . . . be amended
and re-enacted so as to read as follows: 'Any Judge may be recused or recuse him-
self in criminal cases - First - If said Judge be connected by blood or marriage
with the accused. Second -If said Judge be related to the party injured by the
accused within the fourth degree, or if he be the father-in-law, son-in-law or
brother-in-law of the party injured by the accused. Third - If said Judge has
been employed as prosecuting attorney, or for the defense, before his election or
.appointment as Judge.'"
By Act 40 of 1880, it was provided: "Section 1. . . . That any judge of the
district court elected, or who may hereafter be elected, under the Constitution
adopted and ratified in 1879, shall be recused for either of the following causes:
First-His being interested in the cause; provided, that in all civil and criminal
causes, in which the State, the parishes or political or religious corporations are
interested, it shall not be sufficient cause to challenge a judge, who may have
cognizance of the case, to allege that he is a citizen or inhabitant of the State or
the parish, or a member of said political or religious corporation, or that he pays
any State, parish or city tax. Second -His being related to one of the parties
within the fourth degree. Third - His having been employed or consulted as
advocate in the cause. Fourth-His being the father-in-law, son-in-law, or
brother-in-law of one of the parties. Fifth -His having rendered definitive judg-
ment in the cause in any other court."
LA. CODE OF CRIA. PROC. art. 303 (1928) provided the following causes for
recusation : "First - His being interested in the cause; provided that in all causes
in which the State, the parishes or political or religious corporations are interested,
it shall not be sufficient cause to challenge the judge, who may have cognizance
of the case, to allege that he is a citizen or inhabitant of the State or of the
Parish, or a member of said political or religious corporation, or that he pays
any State, parish or city tax; Second- His being related to the accused or to
the party injured within the fourth degree; Third- His having been employed or
consulted as advocate or counsel in the cause; Fourth-His being the husband,
the father-in-law, son-in-law, or brother-in-law of the accused or of the party in-
jured; Fifth- His having rendered definitive judgment in the cause in any other
court."
21. See Marsin v. Udall, 78 Ariz. 309, 279 P.2d 721 (1955).
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303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as revised in 1950, pro-
vide the following causes for recusation:
"(1) His being interested in the cause; but in any cause
in which the state, or one of its political subdivisions, or any
religious corporation, is interested, the fact that the judge is
a citizen of the state or a resident of the political subdivision,
or pays taxes thereto, or that he is a member of the religious
corporation, shall not constitute a ground for recusation.
"(2) His being the spouse of one of the parties or one
of the attorneys; his being related to one of the parties or
to the spouse of one of the parties within the fourth degree,
or to one of the attorneys or to the spouse of one of the at-
torneys within the second degree. 22
"(3) His being a material witness in the cause.
"(4) His having been employed or consulted as an attor-
ney in the cause or his having been associated with an attor-
ney during the latter's employment in the cause.
"(5) His having performed any judicial act in the cause
in any other court. '23
The following is a brief examination of each of the five
causes for recusation listed in the Louisiana statute.
1. Interest. The most litigated ground and also the broadest
basis for recusation is "his being interested in the cause. '24 A
22. LA. CODE OF CRTM. Paoc. art. 303 (1928) makes the appropriate substitute
in clause 2 of the words "the accused or the party injured" for the term "the
parties" of the Code of Practice: "(2) His being the spouse of the accused or the
party injured or one of the attorneys; his being related to the accused or to the
party injured or to the spouse of the accused or the party injured within the
fourth degree, or to one of the attorneys or to the spouse of one of the attorneys
within the second degree."
23. The materials for the Code of Practice Revision presented at the January
24, 1958, meeting of the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute, recommend
merely an editorial revision of its source provisions. The grounds for recusation
are listed as follows: "A judge of any court, trial or appellate, may be recused
when he: (1) Is a material witness in the cause; (2) Has been employed or con-
sulted as an attorney in the cause, or has been associated with an attorney during
the latter's employment in the cause; (3) Has performed a judicial act in the
cause in another court; (4) Is the spouse of a party, or of an attorney employed
in the cause; or is related to a party, or to the spouse of a party, within the fourth
degree; or is related to an attorney employed in the cause, or to the spouse of the
attorney, within the second degree; or (5) Is interested in the cause. In any
cause in which the state, or a political subdivision thereof, or a religious body or
corporation is interested, the fact that the judge is a citizen of the state or a
resident of the political subdivision, or pays taxes thereon, or is a member of the
religious body or corporation, is not a ground for recusation."
24. See Bennett, Louisiana Criminal Procedure-A Critical Appraisal, 14
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 11, 26 (1953).
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judge who has only an indirect interest, say, of a general taxpayer
or property owner is not disqualified to try a case involving taxes
or assessments.2  The Code specifically provides that no chal-
lenge lies where the interest results only from the judge's being
a citizen or an inhabitant of an interested state or parish, a
member of an interested political or religious corporation or a
taxpayer of any state, parish or city.
26
What facts are necessary to show the "interest" required by
the Louisiana statute? The "interest-in-the-cause" as a ground
for a change of judge has been restricted by the jurisprudence
to the situation where the judge has a personal and direct "ma-
terial interest or advantage" to be derived from the outcome of
the case. A judge who is a major stockholder in a business cor-
poration which is a party to the suit would clearly be disqualified
by reason of "interest." Beyond such situations, the problem
becomes difficult. The statutory provision, according to the
jurisprudence, includes only the situation where the judge for
reason of "personal advantage or material gain" has evidenced
a definite hostility or antagonism towards the party. Personal
feeling (animosity or favoritism) on the part of the judge is not
enough for recusation..2 7 The interpretation given to the statu-
tory phrase "interest in the cause," as meaning "to the judge's
personal advantage" and that an allegation of bias or prejudice
does not describe interest sufficient to recuse the judge, is, it
almost goes without saying, a hazy limitation on the right to
recuse.
28
25. See Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School Board, 206 La. 317, 19 So.2d 153
(1944).
26. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 303(1) (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
337(1) (1870). See State v. Livaudais, 161 La. 882, 109 So. 536 (1926).
27. See cases cited in State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 655, 38 So.2d 371, 375
(1948).
28. A general statement to the effect that the judge is prejudiced and biased
against the party, or a naked allegation of interest, permits the judge-to-be-recused
to overrule the motion. See State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 38 So.2d 371 (1948) ;
State v. Phillips, 159 La. 903, 906, 106 So. 375, 376 (1925) ; State v. Davis, 154
La. 928, 98 So. 422 (1923). See discussion page 661 infra, for procedure for
recusation.
In the New York case of People v. McDonald, 8 Misc.2d 50, 167 N.Y.S.2d 394
(1957), defendants were charged with unlawfully removing a gravestone from a
cemetery. The gravestone was left on the lawn of the judge who tried the case.
The defendants contended that the judge was disqualified because the accusation
charged that the gravestone was left on his lawn. The court said: "Section 14 of
the Judiciary Law of the State of New York provides in part that 'a judge shall
not sit as such in, or take any part in the decision of an action * * * in which
he is interested * * *.' It has been held that this interest must be an interest.in
a pecuniary or property right, and one from which the judge might profit or lose.
See Matter of Hancock's Will, 91 N.Y. 284. The question of when a judge should
disqualify himself is generally one of conscience. Some judges disqualify themselvea
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The decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State v.
Hutton and State v. Laborde, among others, serve to illustrate
the rule that personal feeling or opinion on the part of the judge
is not cause for recusation in Louisiana. In the case of State v.
Hutton,29 the defendant, aged 30, and his 19-year-old brother
were charged with burglary. The younger brother was tried
first, and at this trial, the judge said that he thought that the
older brother should receive a heavier sentence in case of con-
viction than that which he proposed to inflict upon the younger
brother. Subsequently, at the trial of the older brother, counsel
for the defense moved for the recusal of the judge. The court
held that the judge's statement at the trial of the younger
brother did not reveal an interest which would require the judge
to recuse himself in the present trial of the older brother.3 0
only when in their own mind their connection with the case is such that they feel
they cannot be fair and unbiased. The practice which impresses me is that a judge
should disqualify himself whenever there might be the slightest impression upon the
part of a litigant that his decision might be swayed by his connection with the
case or his interest in the case, for it is important in the administration of justice
not only that our courts be presided over by judges who are fair and impartial, but
it appears to this court that it is equally important that litigants believe that they
are being tried by a judge who is fair and impartial and not influenced by any
personal interest in the case. The circumstances surrounding this case were such
that if the Judge had been asked to disqualify himself, had refused, and had then
tried and decided the case adversely to the defendants, the judgment of conviction
would necessarily have to be reversed. It is quite apparent that if the Judge had
been drawn as a juror for the trial of the case, the tombstone having been placed
upon his property, a challenge for implied bias by a defendant would have been
sustained. But here the defendants did not object to the jurisdiction of the . . .
[Judge] . . . and they entered a plea of guilty." 167 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396-97 (1957).
Query: In the above case what was the pecuniary or property interest? Was it
the fact that a conviction of the defendants would absolve the person on whose
lawn the gravestone was found? Compare the rule in the law of evidence on
"declarations against interest" as an exception to the hearsay prohibition that the
declaration must endanger the declarant's pocketbook if the statement were true,
and that even a declaration confessing a crime committed by the declarant is not
receivable as a declaration against interest. See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 546, 549
(1954).
Contrast the disqualification in Louisiana of a prospective juror with that of
a judge. A prospective juror is disqualified from jury service even though he says
he is biased for some nonsensical reason. A juror's disqualification for bias can
arise from race prejudice, religious prejudice, or simply because he is hostile or
friendly to the defendant. See Slovenko, The Jury System in Louisiana Criminal
Law, 17 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 655, 696 (1957).
29. 198 La. 174, 3 So.2d 549 (1941).
30. Similarly, a Kentucky court stated: "[T]he mere fact that the trial judge
had indicated or stated his belief in the guilt of the defendant is not enough to
disqualify the judge." White v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Ky. App.
1958) (dicta). See also Nelson v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 1, 258 S.W. 674
(1924). In the case of State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144, 72 Pac. 554 (1903), in
dealing with the question of an entertained opinion by the court of the defendant's
guilt of the crime with which he was charged, and in denying the sufficiency of
that fact to require a vacating of the bench, the court said: "[T]he belief or dis-
belief of a trial judge in the guilt of a defendant put upon trial before him is not
a test of his qualification to preside at such trial. A trial judge may be convinced
from his personal knowledge of the case, or what he has heard from others, of the
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In the case of State v. Laborde,5 l which is noteworthy for its
dictum, the defendant had stated that he wished to waive trial
by jury, whereupon the trial judge remarked that the defendant
would have a better chance before a jury than before this court.
The court, holding that the trial judge was not interested or
biased in the cause, said: "Since State v. Morgan . . . [which
held that a judge is competent although he has expressed a pre-
mature opinion of the merits of the case and is hostile to one
party], it has been unequivocally held that, inasmuch as the
statute does not provide that bias and prejudice of the judge is
a ground for recusation, the accused must offer additional proof
to show that the judge has an interest in the case which means
that 'it is to the judge's personal advantage, whether he would
be influenced by such advantage or not, to decide the case or to
seek to bring about a decision therein, for or against one of the
parties to it, without reference to the law and the evidence.' "132
Even in the absence of a statute that provides that bias and
prejudice is ground for recusation, it would appear that bias and
prejudice of a judge, regardless of its cause, is sufficient to
warrant his recusation under the constitutional provision that
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury."8 3 Indeed, it would
appear that an allegation and description of the bias or prejudice
of a judge, without more, can properly be the basis for recusa-
tion under the present statutory phrase "his being interested
guilt of one put upon trial before him, and yet, with the utmost fairness and im-
partiality conduct the trial, and give the defendant a fair and impartial 'hearing."
Id. at 149, 72 Pac. at 556. But see Wendel v. Hughes, 64 Ohio App. 310, 311, 28
N.E.2d 686, 686 (1940) (the affidavit alleges "that the judge was prejudiced
against her and had already indicated the decision he would render in the case
against her," and therefore the judge was without authority to proceed with the
trial); State v. Atterberry, 134 S.C. 392, 397, 133 S.E. 101, 103 (1926) (thejudge "expressed at the first trial, after the defendant was convicted and in pass-
ing sentence a decided opinion of the guilt of the accused, and should not have
presided at the second trial of the defendant when objection was made, as he had
disqualified himself by expressing that opinion. . . . [B]y his remarks in sen-
tencing the defendant at the first trial he indicated his opinion of the defendant's
guilt, and thereby disqualified himself to preside at the second trial").
31. 214 La. 644, 38 So.2d 371 (1948).
32. 214 La. 644, 656, 38 So.2d 371, 375-76 (1948). See State v. Morgan, 142
La. 755, 77 So. 588 (1917).
33. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9. See Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269, 24 N.W.2d 259(1946). "As to the several requirements of due process, probably the most basic
one is that the tribunal be impartial. A biased judge cannot accord a fair trial."
PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 58 (1952). The United States Supreme Court in
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) said: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of
actual bias in the trial of cases." Id. at 136.
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in the cause." It was so held in 1908 in State v. Banta.34 In
Banta, a motion to recuse the judge on the ground that he was
a personal enemy of the accused and was so biased and prej-
udiced as to be incapable of giving him a fair and impartial
trial was held to be well taken and to exhibit that the judge had
an interest in the cause.35 Fifteen years later, however, the
case was overruled in State v. Davis. 6 Justice Land dissented
in Davis, contending that, even without a statute on recusation,
a biased or prejudiced judge is subject to disqualification under
the constitutional provision requiring a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury T
A quarter of a century after Davis the constitutional argu-
ment was again advanced, in the Laborde case, discussed above,38
but the court was able to avoid the issue by its holding that the
remark of the trial judge (that the defendant would have a
better chance before a jury than before the court) did not in-
dicate that the judge was biased or prejudiced against the de-
fendant. The court said: "We do not find it necessary in the
case at bar to consider whether the provisions of Section 9 of
Article I of the Constitution affect the soundness of the pro-
nouncements that bias or prejudice of a judge is not, of itself,
sufficient to warrant his recusation in a criminal case - for,
assuming that it is, we do not think that the remark of the judge
in this matter authorizes the conclusion that he was biased or
prejudiced against appellant or that he was unable to give him
a fair and impartial trial." 9
2. Relationship. The law restricts the right to obtain recusa-
tion to the party who is not related to the judge. The party
related to the judge may not obtain his recusation. 40 The law
34. 122 La. 235, 47 So. 538 (1908).
35. See also State v. Doucet, 199 La. 276, 5 So.2d 894 (1942), 16 TuiL L.
REv. 627 (1942) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1938-1989
Term-Criminal Law and Procedure, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 214 (1950).
The Doucet case is a relatively liberal holding. The case involved an indictment
of the defendant for embezzlement of public funds, allegedly committed by a system
of overpayment of deputies and subsequent "kickbacks" by the deputies for polit-
ical purposes. The Supreme Court ordered the recusal of the trial judge, who hadjeen the leader of a rival political faction interested in securing the defendant's
conviction in order to prevent his re-election to the office of sheriff. The fact that
Jhe activity of the judge occurred prior to his induction into judicial office was
.onsidered immaterial.
36. 154 La. 928, 98 So. 422 (1923).
37. Quoted in State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 655 n.3, 38 So.2d 371, 376 n.3
(1948).
38. See note 31 supra.
39. 214 La. 644, 657, 38 So.2d 371, 376 (1948).
40. See Bonnefoy v. Landry, 4 Rob. 23 (La. 1843).
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naively presumes that the relations between a judge and his
relatives are always sympathetic.
By an affinity relationship, a judge is disqualified when he
is the spouse of one of the parties (or of the accused or injured
party in a criminal case), or of one of the attorneys.
By a consanguinity relationship, a judge is disqualified when
he is related within the fourth degree to one of the parties (or
the accused or injured party in a criminal case) or to the spouse
of either. It is true that "all the inhabitants of the earth are
descended from Adam and Eve, and so are cousins to one an-
other," but "the further removed blood is, the more cool it is."'41
The judge is also disqualified when he is related within the
second degree to one of the attorneys or to the spouse of one of
the attorneys. This provision does not allow disqualification
when the attorney in the case is a former partner of the judge,
a former faculty colleague, a former law clerk, or an intimate
personal friend. Consanguinity relationship within the second
degree is the test. It is problematical whether a judge can be
disqualified when the attorney who is the relative is not directly
participating in the case but another member of his firm is
directly responsible for the case.
42
In the case State v. Standard Oil Co.,43 the father of an
assistant attorney general representing the state in litigation
was held competent to sit as judge. The court held that the
41. Vernon v. Manners, 2 Plowden 425, 75 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1572) (case
involved jury relationship).
42. Prior to Act 203 of 1918, amending LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 338 (1870),
there was no statutory provision expressly recusing a judge because of relation-
ship to the attorney. See note 19 supra. However, the court, prior to the 1918 act,
held that the term "parties," in the provision "His being related to one of the
parties within the fourth degree," means every person who has a substantial
pecuniary interest in the result of the lawsuit, whether mentioned in the pleadings
or not. See White v. McClanahan, 133 La. 396, 63 So. 61 (1913). In this case,
the trial judge's son was prosecuting a civil action under an agreement for a
contingent fee. The Supreme Court cited Act 124 of 1906, which confers upon at-
torneys a special first privilege on all judgments obtained by them, and on the
property recovered under the judgments, for the amount of their professional fees,
and which also permits an agreement to be made giving the attorney joint control
over the disposition of the suit or claim. The court said: "The party in interest,
though not a party to the record, is even more surely within the meaning of the
law [disqualifying a judge who is related to a party] than the party to the record
who is without interest . . . . 'Any other construction totally disregards the spirit
and defeats the purpose, of the constitutional prohibition; for if a judge may be
influenced at all in his judgment by the fact that a person who is directly inter-
ested in the result of the suit, is related to him, the potency of the influence is
not lessened by the absence of the related story from the record.' " 133 La. 396, 399,
63 So. 61, 62 (1913). See Notes, 21 TEx. L. REV. 790 (1943), 72 U.S.L. Riv.
241 (1938).
43. 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927).
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statute has no application where the son of the judge is simply
a public officer representing the state. The case involved Ar-
ticle 338 of the Code of Practice, as amended by Act 203 of
1918, providing as a cause for recusation "His being the father,
brother, or son of any one of the attorneys employed in the
cause.' 44 The court stated: "The statute above quoted has no
application where the father, brother, or son of a judge is simply
a public officer representing the state or a public body by virtue
of his said office. Such an officer is not an attorney employed in
the case; he is only exercising the functions imposed upon him
by law, and appears before the court not as an attorney at law,
but as an officer discharging his duty of representing the state or
a public body before the courts. . . . Our conclusion is that a
judge is not required, or permitted, to recuse himself in a case
wherein his father, brother, or son appears before him in his
capacity of public officer representing the state or a public
body; that such an officer is not 'an attorney employed in the
case,' within the meaning of the act above mentioned." The
present statute omits the phrase "employed in the case," pro-
viding simply "his being related ... to one of the attorneys or to
the spouse of one of the attorneys within the second degree.
'45
In State v. Lea,46 involving this later statute, the court held that
a trial judge is not required to recuse himself because he is the
father of the assistant district attorney who participated in the
preparation of the case. The court stated: "This question was
heretofore presented to this Court under a similar statute and
it was held that the statute had no application where an at-
torney was a public officer representing the state by virtue of
his office. This Court held that the judge is not required or
permitted to recuse himself in a case wherein his father, brother,
or son appears before him in his capacity as a public officer
representing the state or a public body. State v. Standard Oil
Co. .... -47 The court is apparently of the opinion that the omis-
sion in the present statute of the phrase "employed in the case,"
upon which the court in 1927 in Standard Oil placed emphasis,
is of no consequence.
3. Witness in the cause. The provision setting forth, as a
cause for recusation of the judge, his being a material witness
44. See note 19 supra.
45. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 303 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRAoTICE art.
337 (1870).
46. 228 La. 724, 84 So.2d 169 (1956).
47. Id. at 730, 84 So.2d at 169.
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in the cause, stands for the principle that one who is acquainted
with a cause should be a witness and not a judge at the trial.48
A judge is not to be a witness before himself. This ground was
originally included in the Code of Practice of 1825, repealed in
1828, and was reinstated in the Code in 1948 at the recommenda-
tion of the Louisiana State Law Institute, and was included in
the 1950 revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
4. Previous employment. The provision of the Louisiana
Constitution forbidding judges to practice law precludes a judge
from representing a party in a lawsuit.49 Article 337 of the
Code of Practice and Article 303 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure provide further that previous employment or consulta-
tion of the judge as advocate or counsel in the cause is a ground
for recusation.50 The challenge may even be made by the party
for whom the judge acted as counsel. 51 When the judge has had
prior contact with a client and the case, it is unlikely that he
will have an open mind when deciding the case on the bench.
Disqualification under the law is limited to the "same matter. '52
The fact that one of the parties employed the judge in a sep-
arate and distinct cause is not ground for his recusation.53
5. Previous judicial act in cause. This provision stands for
the principle that prejudgment of an issue by the judge is a
ground for disqualification. The judge is disqualified for having
performed any judicial act in the cause in any other court. The
fact that a judge, while district attorney, prosecuted the de-
fendant for other offenses is not a ground for recusation, inas-
much as it is not the same cause.5 4 In the case of State v.
Tanner,5 5 the court held that the fact that the judge had awarded
alimony to the defendant's wife and children in a civil action
did not furnish legal cause for his recusation in the prosecution
of the husband for wilful neglect to provide for support of his
family. The court reasoned that in the civil action the judge
48. See State v. Riviere, 225 La. 114, 72 So.2d 316 (1954).
49. See LA. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
50. See Bryan v. Austin, 10 La. Ann. 612 (1855).
51. See State ex rel. Trimble v. Judge, 38 La. Ann. 247 (1886).
52. Stewart v. Mix, 30 La. Ann. 1036 (1878). There is absolute disqualifica-
tion for two years in California in any case of any kind brought by a former
client. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170(4) (Deering, 1937).
53. See State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 38 So.2d 371 (1949) ; Stewart v. Mix,
30 La. Ann. 1036 (1878). A judge in a criminal case would be disqualified for
previous involvement as attorney in civil litigation based on the same facts as the
prosecution. State v. Perkins, 124 La. 947, 50 So. 805 (1910).
54. See State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 38 So.2d 371 (1949).
55. 224 La. 374, 69 So.2d 505 (1954).
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simply determined that the wife and children were in neces-
sitous circumstances and were entitled to support, whereas in
the criminal action the judge determined whether the father
was guilty of criminal neglect of his family, the intentional
failure to furnish support.
Two or more offenses may arise out of the same factual sit-
uation. 56 The court has held that the expression of opinion by
a district judge subsequent to one of several prosecutions of
the same defendant on the same state of facts furnishes no legal
ground for his recusation.5 7 The previous-judicial-act provision
is inapplicable because the causes or offenses are different.
All of any number of several persons who join in the com-
mission of an offense may be jointly indicted for the crime (a
severance of trial is in the discretion of the judge), or each of
them may be indicted separately. 58 In State v. Hutton, discussed
above, ' 9 the defendant, who was jointly indicted with his younger
brother and had obtained a severance of trial, sought recusation
of the trial judge because of his statement at the prior trial of
the younger brother that a heavier penalty should be inflicted
upon him than upon the younger brother. The court denied
recusation on the ground that the judge was not "interested in
the cause." The court did not consider the previous-judicial-act
provision as a ground for disqualification. In law, the cause is
not the same, and consequently, the provision is not applicable,
but, in fact, it cannot be denied that at the second trial the judge
had prejudged the issues.
A judge is competent, after a mistrial, to sit again in the
case. A judge is competent to sit in the case until the prosecu-
tion be at an end. 60 It is also generally recognized that the judge
can hear a case of open-court contempt of himself.61
56. For example, a person who sells intoxicating liquor from his store on
Sunday could, by this single act, be guilty of violating two statutes of the juris-
diction. One statute may prohibit the sale of liquor on Sunday, and a second may
proscribe the sale of liquor to a minor. There can be two convictions if the dealer
sells liquor to a minor on Sunday. Multiple prosecution for several offenses aris-
ing out of the same set of facts is not a violation of the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. See Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TUL. L.
REV. 409 (1956).
57. See City of Lafayette v. Milton, 129 La. 678, 56 So. 635 (1911).
58. See Slovenko, The Accusation in Louisiana Criminal Law, 32 TUL. L. REv.
47, 81 (1957).
59. See note 29 supra.
60. State v. Bill, 15 La. Ann. 114 (1860).
61. See Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1291 (1928).
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III. PROCEDURE FOR RECUSATION
The effort to secure a change of judge in early procedure
was called an "application" or a "petition," and it still, at times,
carries such a label, as in the Louisiana Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. 62 Essentially, however, it is a motion.6 3 This motion, or
application, must be in writing, and must set forth one of the
five statutory causes for the recusation of a judge.64 When a
motion for recusation setting forth a legal cause has been filed,
the judge-to-be-recused has the power to grant the application,
but not to refuse it. If the judge is unwilling to admit his dis-
qualification, when the facts stated, if accepted, constitute a
cause for recusation, he must refer the question to another
judge of the same district, if there be one, or to a judge of an
adjoining district, for determination. At this time the allega-
tions must be established by the recusing party by competent
evidence . 6
The judge need not refer the application for recusation to
another judge for determination when the facts stated, if proved,
would not constitute a legal ground for recusation.6 7 A judge
62. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. arts. 303.1, 309 (1928).
63. See State v. Hayes, 199 La. 549, 6 So.2d 657 (1942). See also LA. CODE
OF PRACTICE art. 338 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1948, No. 336.
64. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 309 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
338 (1870). The partiality of the trial judge is not cause in Louisiana for a
change of venue. Thb remedy is recusation. A change of venue is authorized when
"an impartial trial cannot be obtained in the parish wherein the indictment is
pending" due to "prejudice existing in the public mind, or for some other suffi-
cient cause." LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 292 (1928). See Comment, 44 CALIF.
L. REV. 108 (1956). ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 255 provides: "On a
prosecution by indictment or information the State or the defendant may apply
for removal of the cause on the ground that a fair and impartial trial can not
be had for any reason other than the interest or prejudice of the trial judge." In
some states the prejudice of the trial judge is a ground for changing the venue.
See State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144, 72 Pac. 554 (1903) ; 4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE 107 et seq. (Anderson, 1957).
65. Furthermore, the Code of Practice provides that a "district judge may
recuse himself without any motion for recusation being filed, but only in causes
where a litigant would have grounds for recusing him; and until either the judge
shall have recused himself or a motion for his recusation has been filed, he shall
have full power to act in the cause." LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 338 (1870), as
amended, La. Acts 1948, No. 336.
66. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 309 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
338 (1870) : "[W]here the petition or the motion for the recusation of the judge
alleges facts which constitute a cause of action, the judge must refer it to another
judge for trial, and where on the trial thereof, the allegations are proved by com-
petent evidence, the judge must be recused." State v. Doucet, 199 La. 276, 289,
5 So.2d 894, 898 (1942). The burden of proof falls on the party who alleges in-
capacity. Simon v. Haifleigh, 21 La. Ann. 607 (1869). A decision on the truth
or falsity of the application would be a decision of a question of fact, and in crim-
inal cases not reviewable, except for abuse of discretion.
67. See cases cited in State v. Laborde, 214 La. 644, 655, 38 So.2d 371, 375
(1949). It was early held that an application for recusation which fails to state
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may be recused before trial, or as soon as the defendant becomes
aware of a cause for recusation, but not after trial and judg-
ment.68
The argument has been advanced that recusation of a judge
should not be allowed when the defendant is to be tried by a
jury, inasmuch as it will be the jury which will determine his
guilt or innocence. 9 This was a reason for the English rule
of no recusation of a judge except for direct pecuniary interest.
The contention (if it ever did) no longer has merit. The judge
plays an important part even in a jury trial, and, after the
verdict, it is he who imposes sentence.
IV. APPOINTMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
The Louisiana Constitution authorizes the legislature to pro-
vide for trial of cases where the regular judge has been recused.70
In districts having only one district judge, a district judge who
is recused for cause of interest appoints for the trial of the case
a district judge of an adjoining district, or on application of
the party opposing the judge, appoints a lawyer having the
qualifications of a judge of the district court in which the case
is pending.71 The party opposing the judge, if he so desires,
may make application to the Supreme Court for the appointment
of a judge to try the case. 72 A judge who is recused for any
cause other than interest appoints for the trial a lawyer having
the qualifications of a judge of the district court in which the
recused case is pending.73 The member of the bar who is chosen
one of the grounds specified in the Code will be considered as frivolous. State v.
Chantlain, 42 Ia. Ann. 718 (1890).
68. See LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 338 (1870); State v. Bordelon, 141 La.
611, 75 So. 429 (1917) ; State v. Clark, 142 La. 305, 76 So. 722 (1917).
69. See State v. Doucet, 199 La. 276, 298, 5 So.2d 894, 901 (1942).
70. "Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the Legislature shall
provide for the trial of recused cases in the District Courts by the selection of
licensed attorneys-at-law, by an interchange of judges, or otherwise; said lawyers
sitting for recused judges to have all the qualifications required for district judges
except that of residence in the district." LA. CONST. art. VII, § 38.
71. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 303.1 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
340 (1870). 1A. CONST. art. VII, § 38, provides that lawyers sitting for recused
judges shall have the qualifications required for district judges except that of
residence in the district.
72. LA. CODE OF CaLM. PRoc. art. 303.1 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art.
341 (1870).
73. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 305 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 340
(1870). If no such lawyer can be obtained at the term of the court at which the
recusation is declared, the judge immediately appoints some district judge of an
adjoining district to try the case.
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as acting judge has full judicial power as to that particular
matter. 74
In those parishes in which the district court is presided over
by two or more judges, one of the other judges presides at the
trial of the case.
75
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Disqualification law, as we have seen, requires of necessity
a distinction between "general attitude" and "personal bias or
prejudice." A judge without attitudes or ideology, a judge with-
out a philosophy of life, does not grace this earth. Hence, in
one sense of the word, it can properly be said that all judges
are partial. The impartiality and intellectual honesty required
of a judge can by the nature of things only mean the absence
of a personal or particular bias or prejudice towards a party (or
his attorney) in the case.
The phrase "personal bias or prejudice" covers the widest
ambit of individual-to-individual situations. The scope given to
the term and the procedure for recusation varies among the
states. There are "easy" disqualification states and "hard" dis-
qualification states. There is involved a conflict of values. As
Judge Frank put it, if disqualification of judges is too easy,
both the cost and delay of justice go out of bounds, but if dis-
qualification is too hard, cases may be decided quickly, but un-
fairly.76
The five grounds for disqualification listed in the Louisiana
statute are situations where, in the opinion of the legislature,
a likelihood of judicial partiality exists. It would seem appro-
priate for the legislature to add the situation of personal enmity
or favoritism, nothing more required, as a cause for recusation,
or, in the alternative, for the judiciary, to include the situation
within the meaning of the existing statutory phrase "his being
74. See LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 302 (1928); LA. CODE OF PRACTICE
art. 342 (1870).
75. LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 304 (1928) ; LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 339
(1870). If all the judges of a district are recused in any single case, a lawyer
having the qualifications of a judge of the district court in which the case in ques-
tion is pending is appointed. State v. Varnado, 207 La. 1049, 22 So.2d 587 (1945).
When a Supreme Court Justice is recused, he selects a judge of the courts of
appeal or district courts "who shall not be personally interested in the matter in
contestation and shall otherwise be qualified to sit in the trial of the case." LI.
R.S. 13:101 (1950).
76. See Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 608 (1947).
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interested in the cause. ' 77 A judge who bears a personal preju-
dice towards a party, for any reason or for no reason, is not
a proper person to decide the case. Personal animosity or
favoritism deprives a judge of the impartiality which he should
possess.
It is also recommended that legislation be enacted which
allows one challenge, automatic in nature, in the case of a naked
allegation of personal animosity or favoritism. To put it in other
terms, it is recommended that the mere filing of an affidavit of
personal bias should be sufficient to oust the judge from the
cause.
These proposals are supported by the following considera-
tions. The first proposal, which recommends a broad basis for
disqualification, can be adopted without the second, which rec-
ommends a peremptory procedure.
(1) Basis for recusation. The Codex of Justinian,78 the
French Code of Procedure,79 the statutes of a number of Ameri-
can states, 0 the federal law8l and the Model Code of Criminal
Procedure 2 provide that "personal bias or prejudice," in the
77. "The principle of disqualification is to have no technical or strict construc-
tion, but is to be broadly applied to all classes of cases where one is appointed to
decide the rights of his fellow citizens. . . . Disqualifying statutes are not to ,be
construed in a strict, technical sense, but broadly, with liberality." Quoted by
the court in White v. McClanahan, 133 La. 396, 63 So. 61 (1913).
78. JUSTINIAN CODE 3.1.16.
79. FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 378. See also GERMAN CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 41.42.
80. See statutes cited ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 720 et seq.
(1930). See also Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947).
81. See Schwartz, Disqualification for Bias in the Federal District Courts, 11
U. PITT. L. REV. 415 (1950). "Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district
court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in
favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts
and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not
less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to
be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A
party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a
certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith." 63 STAT. 99,
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1949). See United States v. Rosenberg, 157 F. Supp. 654, 662
(E.D. Pa. 1958). Under the federal law the mere filing of an affidavit of the
judge's prejudice does not automatically disqualify him, but he has authority to
decide whether the claim of bias is legally sufficient. Behr v. Mine Safety Appli-
ances Co., 233 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 942 (1956). The
judge against whom an affidavit of bias and prejudice is filed must accept as
true the alleged facts and can proceed no further if the alleged facts support the
conclusion of bias and prejudice. See United States v. Lattimore, 125 F. Supp.
295 (D. D.C. 1954) ; United States v. Pendergast, 34 F. Supp. 269 (D. Mo. 1940),
82. ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 250 (1930).
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broad sense of the term, is cause for recusation. The trend
among the various states is toward more general disqualifica-
tion. It is curious to observe that while certain facts which fall
within the Louisiana statute will disqualify, because they raise
the presumption or likelihood of bias, in some instances an actual
showing of bias will not.83 Moreover, as one writer put it, it is
an irrational distinction to hold that interest is a sufficient
ground for disqualification, but that prejudice is not. 4
(2) Procedure for recusation. Some states provide that a
judge determines the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. A num-
ber of other states, however, have so-called peremptory statutes
which disqualify a judge ipso facto upon the filing by a party
litigant of an affidavit of belief in his prejudice. Nothing more
is required. The facts supporting the belief need not be alleged.
Just as a number of prospective jurors can be challenged and
excused from service without giving any reason, so can a judge
be challenged peremptorily. "It is the challenge of and not the
fact of prejudice that ipso facto disqualifies the judge from
acting in a particular cause. '85 Proving actual bias and prejudice
of a judge is a difficult and distasteful task. It strikes too close
to the man. Counsel, mindful of their future trial career, desire
to keep on good terms with the judge and, as a result, refrain
from challenging a judge for cause. It seems sound to allow the
recusation of a judge on the bare assertion by litigant or at-
torney that he has reason to believe that the judge is prejudiced.
A peremptory challenge law, in effect, would afford real op-
portunity for merited attacks on a judge for personal bias. It
would also permit the recusation of a judge for his ideology.
The peremptory statute has been sustained against attack made
on the ground that it delegates to litigants the function of deter-
mining the disqualification of a judge.8 6 As in anything else,
83. Note, 41 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1927). Compare, e.g., the Louisiana cases of
White v. McClanahan, 133 La. 396, 63 So. 61 (1913) and State v. Morgan, 142
La. 755, 77 So. 588 (1917).
84. Note, 41 HARv. L. REv. 78, 79 (1927).
85. U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926).
86. See Murray v. Thomas, 80 Ariz. 378, 298 P.2d 795 (1956); Marsin v.
Udall, 78 Ariz. 309, 279 P.2d 721 (1955) ; Johnson v. Superior Court, 329 P.2d
5 (Cal. 1958) ; Howell v. State, 77 Fla. 119, 81 So. 287 (1919) ; State v. Hoist,
11 Minn. 325, 126 N.W. 1090 (1910) ; State ex rel. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. v.
Clancy, 30 Mont. 529, 539, 77 Pac. 312, 315 (1904) ("this proceeding to disqualify
a judge is analogous to a proceeding for change of venue, and no one has yet denied
the right of the legislature to provide for a change of venue upon such terms as it
may propose") ; State ex rel. Clover Valley Lumber Co. v. Sixth Judicial District
Court, 58 Nev. 456, 83 P.2d 1031 (1938) ; State ex rel. Beach v. Fifth Judicial
District Court, 53 Nev. 444, 5 P.2d 535 (1931) ; Moruzzi v. Federal Life & Cas.
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there is in the peremptory disqualification statute the possibility
of abuse by the filing of trivial accusations of prejudice. It is
true that a peremptory statute affords opportunity for un-
merited attacks on a judge and needless delay of trial. How-
ever, a limitation of one free challenge for personal bias, perjury
statutes, and the honor of the attorney are safeguards against
abuse of the privilege. s7 At any rate, a desirable rule should not
be rejected because of the possibility of abuse.
An easy disqualification statute will allow the parties to
obtain relief from judges in whom they have confidence in their
freedom from prejudice."" As the Louisiana Supreme Court it-
self said on one occasion, "Next in importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such man-
ner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of the
judge. ' 8 s It is interesting to observe that today a number of
Co., 42 N.M. 35, 75 P.2d 320 (1938) ; State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M.
73, 76, 28 P.2d 511, 512 (1933) ("It is no invasion of judicial power for the
Legislature to say that such power shall not be exercised by judges who are be-
lieved by litigants to be partial. There can be no vestiture of judicial power in
judges who are partial") ; State em rel. Bushman v. Vandenberg, 203 Ore. 326, 280
P.2d 344 (1955) ; U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926) ; State v.
Thompson, 43 S.D. 425, 180 N.W. 73 (1920) ; State ex rel. Nissen v. Superior
Court, 122 Wash. 407, 210 Pac. 674 (1922) ; State ex rel. Dunham v. Superior
Court, 106 Wash. 507, 180 Pac. 481 (1919) ; Murdica v. State, 22 Wyo. 196, 137
Pac. 574 (1914).
87. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35 (1921).
88. See 46 CoNo. REc. 2627 (1911).
89. White v. McClanahan, 133 La. 396, 63 So. 61, 62 (1913), quoting Crook
v. Newberg, 124 Ala. 479, 27 So. 432 (1900). The following language of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court is noteworthy: "It is important, of course, not only that
the integrity and fairness of the judiciary be maintained, but also that the busi-
ness of the courts be conducted in such a manner as will avoid suspicion of unfair-
ness .... Prejudice, being a state of mind, is very difficult to prove, and, when a
judge asserts that he is unbiased, courts are naturally reluctant to determine that
he is prejudiced. In order to insure confidence in the judiciary and avoid the sus-
picion which might arise from the belief of a litigant that the judge is biased in
a case where it may be difficult or impossible for the litigant to persuade a court
that his belief is justified, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that a party
should have an opportunity to obtain the disqualification of a judge for prejudice,
upon a sworn statement, without being required to establish it as a fact to the
satisfaction of a judicial body .... The possibility that the section may be abused
by parties seeking to delay trial or to obtain a favorable judge was a matter to
be balanced by the Legislature against the desirability of the objective of the
statute. Moreover, [the section] contains safeguards designed to minimize such
abuses. It permits only one challenge to each side, requires that the party or his
attorney show good faith by declaring under oath that the judge is prejudiced,
and provides for timely making of the challenge before trial, for strictly limited
granting of continuances, and for reassignment as promptly as possible. We can-
not properly assume that there will be a wholesale making of false statements
under oath, and the fact that some persons may abuse the section is not a ground
for holding the provision to be unconstitutional." Johnson v. Superior Court, 329
P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1958).
It is interesting to note that the arbitrator, who is selected by the parties in
dispute, enjoys a very high reputation for fairness. The growing practice of arbi-
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common law states are more willing than Louisiana to follow
the procedure of the Justinian Code.90
tration might be looked on as part of a swing back to the medieval custom by
which members of the mercantile community adjusted their disputes among them-
selves, without recourse to the general judicial system. See GILMORE AND BLACK,
THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 227 (1957).
90. See statutes listed p. 720 et seq. of the ALI MODEL CODE OF CRIMINAL
PRocEDUnE (1930). The Model Code recommends:
"Section 250. Change of Judge. On a prosecution by indictment or informa-
tion the State or a defendant may apply for a change of judge on the ground that
a fair and impartial trial can not be had by reason of the interest or prejudice
of the trial judge.
"Section 251. Application for change of judge -how made. The application
for change of judge shall be in writing and shall be presented in open court and
then filed. It shall state the ground on which it is based. When made by the
State it shall be verified by affidavit of the prosecuting attorney. When made by
the defendant it shall be verified by his affidavit and shall also be accompanied by
a certificate of counsel of record that it is made in good faith.
"Section 252. Number of applications for change of judge. Neither the State
nor any defendant in the same cause may make more than one application for
change of judge.
"Section 253. Application for change of judge-when made. The application
for change of judge may be made only before or at the time the cause is called for
trial.
"Section 254. Duty of judge upon application for change of judge. When an
application is made to a judge for a change of judge he shall proceed no further
in the cause, but a judge who is competent to act shall be substituted for him."
